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I. Introduction1
International free trade agreements invoke passionate debates
regarding the merits, risks, and shortcomings that are necessarily a
part of any such agreement. This is understandable, given that
trade liberalization creates both winners and losers, whether
viewed from a short-term or long-term perspective. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is no exception. The
concerns of NAFTA's opponents that were initially voiced over
ten years ago have not been attenuated by the passage of time.
Neither has the enthusiasm of its supporters been toned down.
Both groups recognize that, indeed, the change in development
strategy in favor of state downsizing and trade liberalization
implemented since the mid-1980s, culminating with NAFTA, is
t Regional Adviser, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC).
tt Professor, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).
ttt Economist, ECLAC.
I The opinions here expressed are the authors' own responsibility and may not
necessarily coincide with those of the United Nations Organization or of FLACSO.
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the most prominent event in Mexico's economic history in the last
five decades. 2 There is a consensus that NAFTA was a key
instrument behind the surge of exports and foreign direct
investment (FDI) that has taken place in Mexico in the last ten
years. The academic and political debates continue, however,
regarding NAFTA's effects on the Mexican economy.
Advocates of NAFTA argue that without the agreement in
place, Mexico's export and FDI boom would not have occurred.
More importantly, they view the agreement as the fundamental
reason behind the Mexican economy's prompt recovery after the
economic crisis of 1995.
Without NAFTA, these advocates
argue, the U.S. Treasury would not have so swiftly approved the
emergency U.S. $50 billion support loan to Mexico. Following
the same line of reasoning, Jaime Serra, Mexico's Minister of
Trade when the agreement was signed in 1992, recently stated that
NAFTA was highly beneficial to the Mexican economy.3 In the
most recent study published by the World Bank on the topic, the
authors conclude that, without NAFTA, by 2002 Mexico's global
exports would have been 25% lower, the inflow of FDI 40%
lower, and its per capita income 5% lower than the actual levels.4
While they admit that NAFTA alone cannot guarantee economic
convergence in North America, they nevertheless conclude that
the trade agreement helped to bring Mexico's level of
development closer to that of its trading partners.
On the other hand, NAFTA's opponents claim that the benefits
realized from the agreement have been highly concentrated in
2 There is a vast literature on NAFTA, the review of which goes beyond the
purposes of this Article. For the most recent contributions that rekindled the debate on
assessing the agreement's impact after ten years see J. AUDLEY ET AL., NAFTA's Promise
and Reality: Lessons for the Hemisphere, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR PEACE (2003); R.
Blecker, The North American Economies After NAFTA: A Critical.Appraisal., INT'L J.
POL. ECON., (forthcoming 2005); A. TORNELL ET AL., NAFTA AND MEXICO'S LESSTHAN-STELLAR PERFORMANCE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10289, 2004); D. Lederman et al., Lessons From NAFTA for Latin American and the
Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research Findings, World Bank (2004); M.
Weisbrot et al., NAFTA at Ten: The Recount (2004), at http://www.cepr.net/

publications/NAFTA atTen.htm.
3 Jaime Serra, Hacia la profundizacion de la integracion economica de Mexico en
el continente Americano, (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) available
at http://cursos.itam.mx/bcondonINAFrA/integracioneconomica.
4 Lederman, et al., supra note 2.
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relatively few firms, activities, and regions, and they were more
than compensated by its adverse effects on the overall economy.
In a critical review of the econometric work of the World Bank
study mentioned above, the authors arrive at the opposite
conclusion: NAFTA has reduced the average income per capita
growth in Mexico,5 and its beneficial impact on exports did not
compensate for its negative effects. In particular, the authors note
the erosion of Mexico's inter-industrial links and the increase in
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor. The net result
was a reduction of Mexico's potential long-term economic growth
and a widening gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots."
It is worth pointing out that such passionately adverse
reactions to NAFTA are not isolated to Mexico. A recent report in
the Financial Times indicates that many of the same views are
present today in some groups within the United States:
The textile state of North Carolina has seen employment in
its staple industry collapse from more than 250,000 jobs to
just 100,000 since the signing of the North American Free
Trade Agreement in 1992. For many, NAFTA is a dirty
word and the state's congressmen are skeptical it will fare
any better in future free trade deals ....
Some commentators have taken a more balanced approach,
concluding that, in general, "NAFTA has been neither the disaster
its opponents predicted nor the savior hailed by its supporters." 7 It
is important to note that when focusing on "its effects on people's
lives, livelihoods, and households," 8 the authors observe a highly
adverse impact of NAFTA on rural and vulnerable populations. 9
They add that NAFTA deteriorated Mexico's labor markets and
report that from 1994 to 2002, manufacturing employment
increased by 500,000 positions, but the agricultural sector lost 1.3
million jobs.1 °
Such divergence in the assessment of NAFTA may be partly
5 Weisbrot et al., supra note 2.
6 Christopher Swann, Envoys take free trade fight into enemy territory,
FINANCIAL. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at 4.
7 AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2.

8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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explained by ideological differences. This divergence, however,
may also reflect the inherent methodological difficulties that
prevail when isolating the impact of NAFTA from the impact of
For example, Mexico implemented radical
other variables.
macroeconomic reforms and policy changes during the same
period in order to shift away from its traditional development
strategy of import substitution and state-led industrialization. Ten
years prior to NAFTA's signing, Mexico began a drastic and
unilateral process of trade liberalization. These contradictory
assessments of the agreement may be due in part, however, to the
differences in the expectations it raised. The official rhetoric on
NAFTA identified it as an ambitious step forward in the region's
route towards development. 1 As stated in Article 102 of the
Agreement, NAFTA's initial objectives were to:
Eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the
Parties; promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade
area; increase substantially investment opportunities in the

territories of the Parties; provide adequate and effective
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in
each Party's territory; create effective procedures for the
implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint
administration and for the resolution of disputes; and establish a

framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this
Agreement.12

The Mexican government saw NAFTA as an instrument to
achieve three goals. First, the Agreement was thought to have the
potential to boost Mexico's trade and FDI flows with the United
States and Canada.

Second, NAFTA was to induce local and

foreign firms (both within and outside of the NAFTA region) to
invest in the production of tradable goods in Mexico in order to

11 AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2. "NAFTA fuels economic growth and dynamic

trade, stimulates investment ... and provides greater job opportunities in North America."
Id. "The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has brought economic
growth and rising standards of living for the people of all three member countries [since
1994.]"

Canadaand the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadian Ministry of

International Trade, at http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/nafta-Al.ena/menu-en.asp.
12 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 102, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289.
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exploit the region's potential as an export platform to the United
States. The belief was that such an investment would launch
Mexico into a phase of high and sustained economic growth led by
exports. The third, and decisively political objective of NAFTA,
was to guarantee the lock-in of Mexico's macroeconomic reform
process. In this Article, we refrain from attempting to estimate
NAFTA's impact on the Mexican economy. Instead, we examine
the extent to which the three objectives of the Mexican
government have been fulfilled.
Following this introductory section, Part II provides a
background of Mexico's road to NAFTA, placing it in the overall
context of the radical macroeconomic reform put in place in the
last two decades. It focuses on two key aspects, foreign trade and
FDI, examining the evolution of exports and imports as well as the
overall trade balance performance. Part II closes with a brief
assessment of the degree to which the external constraints on the
Mexican economy are more binding today. Part III analyzes
Mexico's overall growth performance after NAFTA in comparison
with other countries in the region. Attention is placed on the
evolution of employment and whether there has been a
convergence in per capita income with the United States, both
aspects that NAFTA and the macroeconomic reforms were
supposed to strengthen. Part IV addresses the evolution of liberal
Finally, Part V puts forward our
reforms since NAFTA.
conclusions and policy recommendations.
II. NAFTA, External Trade, and Foreign Investment in
Mexico
A. The Road to NAFTA: UnilateralTrade Liberalizationand
ForeignInvestment Deregulation
In the aftermath of the most dramatic balance-of-payments
crisis Mexico had faced in decades, the early 1980s was seen by
the government as an optimal time for economic reform.
President De la Madrid commenced the implementation of this
structural reform, designed to shift the economy away from its
traditional state-led development and trade protectionist strategy.
the
included
reform
of
this
elements
Important
deregulation/privatization of public enterprises and the opening of
Mexico's domestic market to foreign competition.

1002

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 30

In order to encourage foreign competition, the Mexican
government began to remove a number of tariff and non-tariff
restrictions on imports. A crucial step towards this goal came in
1986 when Mexico became a full member of GATT, which
initiated a gradual elimination of some restrictions to foreign
investment, particularly in capital and technology intensive
industries. By 1988, the coverage of import licenses as well as the
average tariff rate had been sharply reduced. In addition, the
setting of official prices on imported goods had been completely
eliminated. From 1988 to 1994, President Salinas de Gortari's
administration worked to accelerate further the economy's
structural reforms. In 1989, a new regulatory framework on
foreign investment was approved, eliminating restrictions to
foreign capital's participation in roughly 75% of all branches of
economic activities.13 December 1993 marked the enactment of a
new law governing foreign investment. This law simplified
administrative procedures governing foreign investments and
with
eliminated all restrictions on FDI in manufacturing industries
14
petrochemicals.
basic
and
explosives
of
the exception
By the time NAFTA's negotiations began in 1990, Mexico15
was already one of the world's most open developing economies.
Two years later, the trilateral agreement among Mexico, the
United States, and Canada was signed and slated to go into effect
on January 1, 1994. The parties committed themselves not only to
the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional
trade, but also to loosening restrictions on foreign investment over
the next ten years.16 Few trade restrictions were maintained in the
agriculture (approximately 7% of the value of imports), oil
refining, and transportation equipment industries. For Mexico, the
most significant purpose of NAFTA was to institutionalize their
Secretaria de comercio y formento industrial (SECOFI), Reglamento de Ley para
Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera.
14 F. Clavijo & S. Valdivieso, La creacion de empleos mediante el comercio
exterior, el caso de Mexico, 50 EL TRIMESTRE ECONoMICO 2, 873-916 (Apr.-Jun. 1983);
J.C. Moreno-Brid, Liberalizacion Comercial. y la Demanda de Importaciones en
Mexico, 240 INVESTIGACION ECONOMICA 13 (2002).
15 Charles Oman, The Policy Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization
(Policy Brief, 29) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(1996).
16 SECOFI, supra note 13; OECD supra note 15.
13
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trade liberalization strategy in an agreement enforced with the
United States, its key trading partner and the major player in
global trade. 17
B. Mexico: From Oil to Manufactures
NAFTA greatly facilitated Mexico's trade liberalization goals,
allowing Mexico to become a dynamic player in exports of non-oil
products and to insert itself into global markets. Table 1 compares
the export performance of selected countries, examining their
changing shares in world markets from 1985 to 2001. In both
periods, China stands at the top of the list, with its share of world
(non-oil) exports increasing the most: 3.35% between 1985 and
1994, and an additional 1.93% between 1996 and 2001. During
the same time period, Mexico's performance increased
substantially, moving from seventh to second place in the
rankings.'"

17 P. Pacheco-Lopez & A. P. Thirlwall, Trade Liberalisation in Mexico: Rhetoric
and Reality, 229 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. REv. 141 (2004); P. Skott & M.
Larudee, Uneven Development and the Liberalization of Trade and capital Flows: The

Case of Mexico, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 277-95 (1998); After NAFTA, Mexico signed
several more trade agreements, including those with the European Union, Japan and
various Latin American countries.
18 Notice that some of the countries with more change in share market were
previously conforming to the USSR, so that they did not have trade transactions with the
western world at that time.
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Table 1. Changes in Participation of Non-Oil Exports in the
World Market (Top 20 Countries), 1985-1994 and 1996-2001
(in percentages)' 9
Rank

1985

1994

Change

1996

2001

Change

I

China

1.53

4.89

3.35

China

5.37

7.30

L93

2

Russia

0.00

0.81

0.81

Mdxico

1.89

2.85

0.96

3

Singapore

0.76

1.57

0.81

Ireland

0.96

1.52

0.56
0.45

4

Malaysia

0.87

1.62

0.75

Canada

4.19

4.64

5

Thailand

0.50

1.12

0.62

S. Korea

2.35

2.72

0.37

6

S. Korea

1.72

2.28

0.56

Philippines

0.52

0.78

0.26

7

Mexico

3.03

1.54

0.51

United States

13.88

14.10

0.22

8

Indonesia

0.38

0.75

0.37

Hungary

0.30

0.50

0.20

Czech Rep.

0.32

0.46

0.14

0.42

0.55

0.13

Malaysia

1.75

1.88

0.13

9

Spain

1.48

1.83

0.34

10

Czech Rep.

0.00

0.29

0.29

11

United States

13.34

13.56

0.22

12

Ireland

0.69

0.87

0.18

Poland

0.40

0.48

0.08

India

0.51

0.67

0.16

Indonesia

0.80

0.86

0.06

14

Slovenia

0.00

0.14

0.14

Thailand

1.19

1.25

0.06

15

Poland

0.24

0.38

0.14

Vietnam

0.13

0.19

0.06

16

Ukraine

0.00

0.11

0.11

Slovakia

0.11

0.15

0.04

Turkey

0.41

0.46

0.04

0.16

0.19

0.04

0.09

0.13

0.04

0.11

0.15

0.03

13

Israel

17

Turkey

0.30

0.40

0.10

18

Vietnam

0.02

0.11

0.09

Romania

19

Slovakia

0.00

0.08

0.08

Costa Rica

20

Croatia

0.00

0,07

0.07

United Arab Emirates

Though not always recognized, Mexico's export drive started
nearly ten years before NAFTA's inception, dating back to the
country's trade liberalization policies of the early 1980s.
Nonetheless, 1994 marked a turning point, as the launch of
NAFTA opened an unprecedented window of opportunity to
export to the United States, the largest world market. A few years
later, exports had increased by approximately 20%, reaching a
level of 30% of Mexico's GDP.20 Such a dynamic shift in exports
19 Table based on Competitiveness of Analyzed Nations (CAN) 2003 and the
Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
20 See Table 2. An important part of this change is explained for an increase in the
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repositioned Mexico in global trading markets. Having been
primarily an oil exporting economy in the early 1980s, 80% of
Mexico's total exports are currently manufactured goods. This
rapid growth in exports of manufactured goods more than
compensated for the decline in foreign sales of oil and agricultural
commodities. As shown in Table 3, a key element behind this
dynamic performance was the increased presence of maquiladoras
(in-bond industries) in the Mexican economy.
Table 2. Mexico and Other Selected Countries: Exports of
Goods and Services (% GDP), 1980-2003.2I
45

Beginning
of NAFTA

Chile

Mexico

15

5

-

Argentina -

---

7.

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

It is well recognized that the maquiladorasare responsible for
approximately half of the manufactured goods exported by
Mexico. While the dynamic response of Mexico's manufacturing
exports was due in large part to NAFTA, it was also stimulated by
a considerable real depreciation of the exchange rate of the peso
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar that took place in 1995.22 In addition, as
exchange rate of Mexico during the crisis of 1994-1995. The exports as a percentage of
GDP measured in constant 1993 Pesos showed an increased from 17 to 24% during
1994-1995.
21 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).

22 For econometric studies that conclude that NAFrA had no significant impact on
Mexican exports, after controlling for the effect of the real exchange rate depreciation,
see Blecker, supra note 2. See also, Pacheco-L6pez, supra note 17. But see LEDERMAN

ET AL., supra note 2 (claiming that NAFTA boosted Mexican exports).

But, their
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the Mexican economy plunged to a recession in the same year
(real GDP decreased 6%), local companies were pressed to seek
external markets in order to compensate for the collapse of the
domestic market.
Table 3. Composition of Mexican Exports, 1980-2004.23
Beginning of
NAFTA

Beginning of Trade

100

8 0 ----- -------

. .

0

1980

1984

---- --.- .-.-

.

.

.

1988

.

.

.

------ .- ..-

--

.

1992

1-,,,,Agriculture -- a-Manufactures

1996

2000

2004

Oil Exports

Beginning
of NAFTA

70

30
1991

1994

-U-Maquila Exports

1997

2000

2003

--*-Non Maquila Exports

econometric specifications failed to adequately capture the effect of the depreciation of
the exchange rate.
23 INEGI, Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico (National Accounts System)
at www.inegi.gob.mx.
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The preferential access granted by NAFTA led to a strong
increase in Mexico's exports. Key promoters of the overall boost
in exports were the various foreign companies that already had
strong presence in Mexico, including maquiladoras. Additionally,
Mexico's export market benefited from the arrival of foreign
investment in selected sectors, most of which was motivated by
the opportunity or need to use Mexico as an export platform to the
United States. Although subject to certain strict limitations, the
nation's export drive has been accompanied by an increase in the
technological sophistication of Mexican products sold abroad.
Traditionally, Mexico's primary exports had been in commodities,
such as shrimp, coffee, and tomatoes. By the late 1970s, crude oil
was the dominant export item. In the last fifteen years, however,
the majority of Mexico's exports consists of manufactured goods,
including auto parts, automobiles, computers, and electrical and
electronic equipment.
The structure of Mexican exports and their share in (OECD)
total imports from 1985 to 2001 is displayed in Table 4,
classifying them in three groups: (1) exports directly based on
natural resources (agriculture, energy, textile fibers, minerals, and
metals); (2) manufactured goods; and (3) other exports. In turn,
manufactured goods are also classified in two groups: (1) those
that are essentially the result of simple processing of natural
resources and (2) everything else. The second part of Table 4
measures the same categories in terms of their contribution to
Mexico's total exports. A key point to notice is that Mexico's
penetration of the OECD market more than doubled between 1985
and 2001. Equally impressive is the considerable rise in the share
of Mexico's manufactured goods in OECD imports (from 1.1% to
3.8%). Also of note is the particularly fast expansion of exports of
manufactured goods not based on natural resources. While in
1985 they represented 35% of Mexico's total exports, by 1994
their share had mounted to 71% and, in 2001, stood at 78%.
Exports of natural resource based goods experienced a mild
retraction in the OECD market, and collapsed from 58.6% of total
Mexican exports in 1985 to 14.7% in 2001. Passenger vehicles
and other manufactured goods related to the automobile and
telecommunications industries, stood out among Mexico's main
export items during this period.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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Table 4. Selected Indicators of Mexican Exports to the OECD,
1985-200124
Mexico

1985

1990

1994

2001

Market Share

1.78

1.52

2.03

3.62

Natural Resources

3.08

2.10

1.98

2.65

Agriculture

1.30

1.28

1.37

2.09

Energy

4.60

3.26

2.99

3.29

Textile Fibers,Minerals,and Metal

1.89

1.48

1.57

1.49

1.10

1.29

2.02

3.85

Based on NaturalResources

1.23

0.96

1.03

1.26

Not Based on Natural Resources

1.10

1.33

2.10

4.03

Others

1.61

2.54

2.70

4.12

Structure of Exports

100

100

100

100

Natural Resources

58.6

33.6

21.4

14.7

Agriculture

9.7

10.3

8.2

5.1

Energy

45.9

21.0

11.8

9.1

Textile Fibers,Minerals and Metal

3.0

2.3

1.4

0.5

39.1

62.5

74.9

81.4

Manufactures

Manufactures
Based on Natural Resources

3.4

3.4

2.5

1.5

Not Based on NaturalResources

35.0

57.6

70.7

78.1

Others

2.3

3.9

3.7

3.9

The export-driven growth, however, was not felt in all
production sectors in Mexico. Since 1994, though some sectors
gained an increased presence in the international markets, others
retracted. Among those whose exports registered the largest
increases in their shares in the U.S. market were machinery and
transportation
equipment, beverages and tobacco, and

24 Authors' elaboration based on Competitiveness Analysis of Nations (CAN) and
ECLAC, supra note 19. References to Agriculture are derived from Sections 0, 1 and 4;
Chapters 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29. References to Energy are derived from Section 3.
References to Textile Fibers, Minerals and Metals are derived from Chapters 26, 27 and
28. References to Manufactures: Based on Natural Resources are derived from Chapters
61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671. References to Manufactures: Not
Based on Natural Resources are derived from Sections 5 and 6, sections 7 and 8.
References to Manufactures: Others are derived from Section 9.
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miscellaneous manufactures. On the other hand, the exports of
food and live animals, crude oil and related product, mineral fuels,
animal and vegetable oils, and chemical products were unable to
maintain their respective market shares. The impact at the microlevel of the firm was very unevenly distributed. According to
some authors, the bulk of Mexico's non-oil exports originates in
no more than 300 businesses, most of them linked to transnational
corporations.25
The impressive performance of Mexican exports since
NAFTA has been favorably reflected in the country's trade
balance with its major partner, the United States. Since 1995,
Mexico has run trade surpluses with the United States but not with
Canada. Such surpluses have, however, been more than offset by
Mexico's mounting trade deficit with the rest of the world.
Indeed, except for periods of severe recession, Mexico has
systematically registered trade deficits.26
Table 5. Trade Balance of Mexico, 1994-2003 (in billions of
U.S. Dollars)2 7
NAFrA Trade
X-M
I
Exports

Balance of

NAFIA
Balance w/o
Maquiladoras

Balance
of Rest
of World

Trade

1994

53.4

58.6

-5.2

5.8

-11

-13.3

-18.5

1995

68.5

55.4

13.1

4.9

8.2

-6

7.1

1996

82.8

69.4

13.5

6.4

7.1

-6.9

6.5
0.6

1997

96.6

84.1

12.5

8.8

3.6

-11.8

1998

104.8

95.7

9.1

10.5

-1.4

-17

-7.9

1999

123

108.5

14.5

13.4

1

-20.1

-5.6

2000

151.2

131.8

19.4

17.7

1.7

-27.4

-8

2001

143.6

118.3

25.3

19.3

6

-35.2

-9.9

-42.6

-7.9

-45.3

-5.6

2002

146.1

111.4

34.7

18.8

15.9

2003

149.8

110.2

39.7

18.3

21.4

25 J. Mattar et al., Foreign Investment in Mexico after Economic Reform, in
Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico's Economic and Social Policy Challenges
(2003).
26 See infra Table 5.
27 Authors' elaboration based on Estadisticasde Comercio Exterior, INEGI supra
note 23.
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The other favorable development in Mexico's economic
performance, frequently associated with trade liberalization and
NAFTA, is the resulting increase in flow of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI). Measured as a percentage of Mexico's GDP,
FDI registered an impressive growth since the early 1990s,
increasing from levels close to 2% to its peak of 4% in 2001.
Nevertheless, it never reached the relative proportions achieved by
Chile. Moreover, it has stagnated in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis, and has not fully returned to its previous dynamic state.
By 2004, the majority of businesses in Mexico with foreign
capital were of U.S. origin.
Table 6. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP),
1980-200228

O-1---,
1980

1984

Brazil

1988

-- #-Chile

1992

-- o- Medco

1996

2000

-.-- .Argentina

III.Imports, Trade Balance and Long-Term Economic
Growth
In assessing Mexico's trade and FDI performance after
NAFTA, it is critical to examine the evolution of its imports and
28 Authors' elaboration based on World Bank, World Development Indicators,
supra note 21.
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its rate of economic expansion. This is particularly important,
since a key goal of NAFITA and the accompanying overall
macroeconomic reform strategy was to place Mexico onto a path
of high and persistent growth. In the last fifteen years, paralleling
Mexico's export and FDI boom, trade liberalization has been
accompanied by a massive penetration of imports. Given the
decades of trade protection marked by high tariffs and strict
controls on imports, the elimination of such trade barriers was
bound to provoke an intense, although temporary (in principle),
flood of imports. It was assumed that once Mexican consumers
adjusted to the new "menu" of products made available by trade
liberalization, including previously inaccessible foreign goods,
purchases of foreign goods would lose momentum. Such a
slowdown has, however, not occurred.
The first stages of the trade liberalization process implemented
in the late 1980s triggered an explosive increase in imports,
expanding at annual rates above 30%. Such a surge of imports to
Mexico was unparalleled in the region and dwarfed the increase
experienced in both Brazil and Argentina. As a share of GDP,
from 10% in 1982 to more than 30% by the mid
they climbed
29
1990s.

Imports as a percentage of GDP, measured in constant 1993 Pesos, showed a
decrease from 22% to 20% during 1994-1995. This fall is explained by a depreciation of
the exchange rate of Mexico during the economic crisis of 1994-1995.
29
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Table 7. Mexico and Selected Countries: Imports of Goods
and Services (% GDP), 1980-20030
40
Beginning
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A rgentina
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1986 1988

.

1990 1992 1994

Brazil

1996 1998 2000 2002

The swift pace of Mexican imports since the second half of the
1980s was induced not only by the elimination of non-tariff
barriers to foreign trade, but also by the expansion of domestic
demand in the context of a persistent appreciation of the real
exchange rate. The resumption of facilitated access to external
funds also played a role. After decades of highly restricted access,
Mexican consumers began to satisfy their pent-up demand for a
wide variety of foreign goods and brands. Such import demand,
however, also mirrors the increasingly strong relationship between
the exporting sector and foreign suppliers to some extent.
Maquiladoras, the most successful export sector, rely
fundamentally on imported inputs and materials, resulting in a
limited relationship with local suppliers. Another factor that
boosted import penetration to the domestic market, and that cannot
be a priori ruled out, is the likely breakdown of some internal
linkages in Mexico's domestic productive structure; local
producers have been put out of business by foreign competition.
On a more technical basis, a number of applied econometric
studies reveal that in the last fifteen to twenty years, the Mexican
economy has significantly increased its structural dependence on
imports. This indicates that the long-term income elasticity of
30 Authors' elaboration based on World Bank, World Development Indicators,
supra note 21.
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demand for imports has more than doubled in this period.3 '
Traditionally, the value stood between 1.2% and 1.5%, but it is
currently close to 3%. This means that if Mexico's national
income is to grow at an annual average rate of 5%, imports in real
terms will have a tendency to expand 15% annually. Sooner or
later, such a persistent and rapid increase in imports would put
enormous pressure on the economy's exports and other sources of
In fact, to keep the trade deficit from
foreign exchange.
excessively increasing as a proportion of income, Mexican exports
would have to expand at rates of at least 15% per year. Such a
growth rate is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. During their
most prominent and recent boom, 1988-1999, exports expanded at
an average annual rate of 10%, but imports expanded at an even
faster rate of 14%.
Remarkably, and contrary to the a priori expectations, the
dynamism of imports has barely subsided. The most recent data,
as of January 2005, reports an annual increase of 18% in Mexico's
imports, while its real GDP expanded 4.4%. It is unclear whether
such an upward shift in the long-term income elasticity of imports
will prevail in the future. Most likely, it will decrease somewhat
as some of the initial effects of the trade liberalization process on
the demand for foreign goods and services subside. But, if the
income elasticity remains at its current levels, it will create a major
obstacle in Mexico's struggle towards increased economic growth.
Table 8 illustrates how trade liberalization and the process of
macroeconomic reforms have not yet been able to insert Mexico
onto a path of strong export-led growth. It shows that the relation
between trade performance and economic growth has been
deteriorating. Between 1955-1970 and 1971-1982, Mexico's real
GDP expanded at an annual average rate above 6% and registered
a trade deficit of 2.7% and 1.9% of GDP, respectively. The
international debt crisis and the collapse of the domestic oil boom
forced an economic slowdown in the 1980s that was accompanied
by a trade surplus of 1% of GDP. In the first five years after
NAFTA, real GDP expand at a 0.5% annual average rate. This
recovery was short-lived. The renewed appreciation of the peso
eventually slowed down the export boom, and the U.S. economic
31 The "income-elasticity" of imports is the increase, measured in percentage points
that the volume of imports will register for every I% increase in real income.
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recession beginning in 2001 put an end to the dynamism of this
period of export-led growth. In 2001-2003, the Mexican economy
barely grew (2% annual average rate) and registered a trade deficit
of 1.5 - 2% of GDP. Such slow expansion implies that its per
capita income fell three years in a row. In 2004, GDP increased
4.4%, better than its performance in recent years but still far below
both the pre-1980 rates of expansion and the rates that it needs in
order to absorb the vast amount of people entering the labor
market. Therefore, with relatively similar amounts of foreign
resources as a proportion of GDP as it received in the four decades
before the oil collapse, the Mexican economy is now able to grow,
on average, at only one-third of the annual rates it experienced
between 1950-1980, before macroeconomic reforms were put in
place.
Table 8. Trade Balance and Real GDP Growth in Mexico,
1980-200432
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Trade and financial liberalization did result in rapid growth of
exports and, though not sustained FDI. But, Mexico's economic
growth performance has been disappointing. In fact, instead of
closing the gap of its real GDP per capita vis-t-vis the United
States, it has widened. As shown in Table 9, in the late 1980s,
Mexico managed to begin to reduce this gap. This improvement,
32 See INEGI, supra note 23.

Jesus Santamaria Gonzales, Mexico, crecimiento

economico y evolucion de las importaciones, 1960-2002: Una approximacion al analisis
de la restriccion externa, (unpublished thesis UNAM Mexico on file with author).
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however, was short-lived, as the economic crisis of 1995 widened
it once more. Since this time, there has been little change, and the
current GDP per capita difference between the United States and
Mexico stands at a level comparable to what it was in the 1950s.
Table 9. Mexico and Other Countries: Real GDP Per Capita
(Relative to the United States) 1980-2003 (U.S. GDP per capita
= 100, measured in constant 1995 U.S. Dollars)33
40
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Chile
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Contrary to the expectations raised by NAFTA, Mexico has
yet to see any significant convergence in its average income in real
terms with its main regional trade partners.34 A recent study
examining GDP and alternative measures of income concludes
that "there is no evidence of any catch-up in average Mexican
35
living standards to U.S. or Canadian levels under AFTA.
Sustaining long-term economic growth should be a top priority
in the national agenda. The Mexican economy needs to expand at
average annual rates of at least 5-6%, in real terms, just to create
the jobs required to absorb the 2.5% annual increase in its labor
force. Economic expansion needs to be even stronger in order to
33 World Bank, World Development Indicators, supra note 21.
34 Blecker, supra note 2.
35 Id.
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significantly improve the living standards of the more than 13
million Mexicans living in extreme poverty. The evolution of
Mexico's labor market after NAFTA has fallen short of the initial
favorable expectations. There has been a re-composition in total
employment towards export-related activities, but the overall trend
of employment has not seen a significant gain.
Table 10. Mexico: GDP and Employment Generated by
Exports, 1978-2001 (Share of corresponding total on 3the
left6
side)
hand
right
the
on
employed
total
and
hand side,
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More specifically, NAFTA has had adverse effects on
employment in the Mexican rural sector. One consequence of this
is the increased migration flow to the United States. In 2004,
unemployment rates in Mexico reached an all-time high, and the
informal market sector has vastly expanded. In addition, the
earnings and wage gap between the skilled and unskilled labor
force has widened. Unless the economy follows a path of
significant and sustained expansion in order to create an adequate
number of jobs, the nation's social fabric may be severely
damaged.
Think-tanks and various international financial
organizations forecast an expansion of Mexico's real GDP below
4% in 2005. Mexico clearly needs higher rates of expansion; it
36

INEGI, supranote 23.
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remains to be seen whether the growth necessary to decrease
unemployment rates is both achievable and sustainable.
A remarkable trait of the Mexican transition to trade
liberalization was the lack of drastic reallocation processes in
capital and labor within the manufacturing industry. To a certain
extent, the trade patterns and industrial composition after NAFTA
do not radically differ from its previous tendencies. With some
exceptions, NAFTA's reallocation processes have extrapolated
past trends in trade and industrial patterns with little evidence of a
massive restructuring of manufacturing output. Curiously enough,
some of the most successful exporting sectors have their roots in
the import-substituting era and the sector-specific promotion
policies implemented during that time. Mexico's outstanding
export performance in manufacturing is a legacy of the import
substitution period.
In the economy as a whole, labor productivity has stagnated
since the early 1980s. The trade and macroeconomic reforms did
not alter this tendency. Although difficult to disentangle from
other effects, trade liberalization appears to have had some
positive impact on productivity growth in selected manufacturing
industries. In the capital goods and heavy intermediates sectors, it
has allowed for greater intra-industry (and intra-firm)
specialization in foreign trade. In some light industries, such as
food processing and parts of the textile industry, less efficient
local producers were forced to close or modernize. The net effect
of increased exposure to foreign competition on productivity,
however, is very small or even negative. To the extent that the
productivity gains were based on a tendency to eliminate or
displace local producers, the short term social impact could have
been adverse. Whether such an impact is positive in the shortterm depends on the degree to which the labor surplus successfully
makes the transition to gainful employment in the other sectors.
Unlike the support policies implemented in the United States,
Mexico did not institute any program to ease the transition or to
compensate displaced workers affected by the implementation of
NAFTA.
IV. Did NAFTA Lock-In the Reform Processes in Mexico?
Finally, it is necessary to examine whether the Mexican
government's more politically motivated third objective of
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NAFTA was met. There seems to be a consensus that Mexico's
trade and financial liberalization strategies are here to stay. To the
best of our knowledge, there is simply no relevant political party
or organization in Mexico that recommends a return to a
generalized system of trade protectionism. In the last four years,
however, the liberal reform process has stalled. From their first
day in power, President Vicente Fox and his party stated that
Mexico needed to implement fiscal, labor market, and energy
reforms. To date, however, none of these reforms has been
implemented nor is it likely that these reforms will be
implemented in the final two years of the Fox administration. A
survey conducted by Latinobar6metro indicates that there is
growing disenchantment in the population with the results
obtained in Mexico by privatization and other free market oriented
reforms. The three main political parties pay lip-service to the
idea of continuing with the macroeconomic reform processes but,
in practice, have not formed a working coalition to push forward
the pending reforms. In addition, according to the same source,
the majority of the Mexican population surveyed is increasingly
dissatisfied with the results brought about by these reforms. The
dissatisfaction with the new "model based on the free market
mechanisms" is evident not only in Mexico but throughout the
entire region. In fact, an increasing majority of the surveyed
sample by Latinobar6metroopposes the idea that the state should
not intervene in the allocation of economic resources. In other
words, while the majority of the population contends that trade
liberalization in Mexico will not be reversed, there is significant
consensus that the era of radicalized, liberal macroeconomic
reform processes is over.
V. Conclusion
NAFTA, as a part of the package of economic reforms
implemented in Mexico, helped to produce an export boom, a
rapid and strong increase in manufacturing exports, and an inflow
of much needed foreign direct investment accompanied by
technology transfers. The fundamental constraints on Mexico's
long-term economic growth have not been alleviated, however.
Some have actually become more binding. NAFTA's positive
impact may have by now reached a point of exhaustion and the
Agreement should be revamped. It has not been the success
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expected in terms of economic growth or of job generation. The
direct impact of exports on domestic output was limited and offset
by the rupture of backward linkages brought about by the massive
inflow of imported inputs; many of them required for export
production.
Mexico is thus at a crossroads. It can no longer base its
international competitiveness on low wages. But, at the same
time, it has not yet proven itself able to enter international markets
based on knowledge-intensive, high value-added processes and
products. If Mexico is to succeed in its quest to achieve high and
sustained economic growth, there is an urgent need to rethink key
elements of its overall strategy. In particular, this may require
new policies to promote innovation and technological
development, as well as a new wave of public investment to
modernize and widen infrastructure. It is also necessary and
urgent to implement a policy directed to the generation of jobs in
the formal sector of the economy. Without fiscal reform, these
initiatives are not feasible.
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